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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KAN TING FUNG, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: Case No. 950262-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT APPOINTED 
AN INTERPRETER TO WHOM FUNG OBJECTED, BECAUSE IT FAILED 
TO PROPERLY APPLY THE CONTROLLING STATUTE IN A SITUATION 
WHERE THE STATUTE WAS THE ONLY METHOD TO ASSURE THAT THE 
INTERPRETER WAS EFFECTIVE. 
A. Rule 3-306 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 
must be rigorously applied. 
When a language translated at trial is rare, or especially 
unfamiliar to a particular location, there is little likelihood 
that anyone hearing the public proceedings could ever recognize 
errors in the translation. A similar but more acute problem 
exists when translation is whispered only at the defendant's 
table, such as when a criminal defendant exercises her 
constitutional right not to testify. In at least the latter, and 
perhaps often in both situations, the translation is not 
preserved in the record for appeal. As a result, there is simply 
no practical way to determine whether errors in translation in 
fact prejudiced the defendant, and accordingly, there can be no 
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meaningful review of the same. 
Moreover, if prejudicial errors in fact occur in 
translation, whether through honest mistake or on account of some 
concealed or otherwise unknown bias of the interpreter, not only 
is it not preserved in the record for appeal, but also, neither 
the defendant nor his counsel--nor possibly even the interpreter 
himself--would know it at the time, or ever. It is indeed 
possible for a mean-spirited translator to intentionally 
mistranslate proceedings in order to further some personal 
prejudice, albeit at public trial, and no one in all the world 
would be the wiser. The potential for such abuse must 
necessarily be minimized in courts of justice. 
This reflects the situation in the present case. As the 
trial court noted, Cantonese is not a common language and rarely 
is translated in the courts (R. 128). At trial, Fung exercised 
his Constitutional right not to testify. The translation which 
took place to provide Fung an understanding of the proceedings 
was not made part of the record. Kim-Fai Chan's actual 
interpreting performance is in no way reflected in the record 
(R.). Fung is left merely with the protection which the statute 
provided at the interpreter selection stage. 
If a poor translation left Fung with an inadequate 
understanding of the proceedings, he would not have been able to 
effectively counsel with his attorney during the trial. 
Therefore, if Fung's right to understand the proceedings was not 
adequately protected at the interpreter selection stage, he may 
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have been prejudiced in fact, and no one in all the world would 
be the wiser. It is impossible for this court to provide a 
meaningful review of whether errors in translation actually 
prejudiced Fung. Therefore, this court should seek to provide 
other available safeguards against the potential for the gross 
injustice which may have prejudiced Fung. 
The dilemma presented by a rare language, and accentuated 
when the translation is not on record can be moderated by a 
meaningful review of the trial court's application of Rule 3-306 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1992 as amended) 
(hereinafter Rule 3-306). It is the best, and perhaps the only 
means available for this court to provide some protection against 
the type of unknowable prejudice presented here. Accordingly, 
Fung urges this Court to hold that any application of Rule 3-306 
must be rigorous when the language of translation is rare, or 
when the translation will not be made part of the record. 
Failure to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial in this 
way should be held to constitute an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court. 
Though such a holding will not entirely resolve the dilemma, 
it will approach a more adequate protection for Fung, and greatly 
improve the appearance of fairness at trial. Whenever the 
language is rare or the translation is not made part of the 
record, allowing broad discretion in the application of Rule 3-
306 does not provide healthy flexibility to the trial court, 
instead it maximizes the potential for mistake or abuse by the 
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interpreter. 
B. In this case Rule 3-306 was not applied. 
It is extremely unlikely that the trial court was able to 
rigorously, or alternatively, otherwise properly apply Rule 3-306 
when it failed to even recognize its existence. In fact, the 
trial court stated, "until, in the State of Utah we have any 
standards or establish standards regarding court interpreters, 
then it's within the sound discretion of the court to make 
inquiry on the record regarding one's background or skills" (R. 
128) . 
Looking to Rule 3-306 itself, there are two alternative 
procedures for appointing interpreters. Neither was followed 
properly, let alone rigorously, in this case. When a court 
appoints an interpreter Rule 3-3 06 requires that the court 
ascertain that the interpreter meets three requirements (Rule 3-
306(1)(B)). The statute itself emphasizes that these are 
"minimum" requirements by explicit language (Id.).1 
Each of the three statutorily mandated criteria focuses on 
abilities of the interpreter with respect to "terms used in court 
proceedings" (Rule 3-306 (1) (A) (i-iii)) . Before appointing Chan 
1
 The other procedure involves appointing interpreters from a 
list of certified interpreters created by the administrative 
office. The court did not choose this procedure. While Rule 3-306 
directs the administrative office to establish its own criteria for 
certification of interpreters, it requires that the office at very 
least "shall include" the three requirements found in Rule 3-
306 (1) (A) (i-iii) . The court is similarly bound to require those 
three minimum criteria, and presumably, similarly capable to 
require more criteria or higher standards, but not fewer criteria 
or lower standards (Rule 3-306(1) (B). 
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as interpreter, the Court was statutorily compelled to require 
that Chan 1) understand these terms, 2) have the ability to 
explain their meaning in English and Cantonese, and 3) have the 
ability to translate them from English to Cantonese (Id.). 
The record shows the trial court's clear deficiency in 
applying Rule 3-306: 
The court: Next question is, I'm given to 
understand that you may not have had --or you may have 
had very limited contact with the court system; is that 
correct? 
The interpreter: I understand court system, but 
some of the terms, direct Cantonese translation, I may 
not understand2 (R. 126-27). 
This was the court's only inquiry even close to the criteria 
required by Rule 3-306. Chan's response suggests that he fails 
all three statutory requirements. Chan's admission that he does 
not understand some terms also means that he cannot meet the 
remaining two requirements either. 
Additionally, although no translation is part of the record, 
Chan's dialogue with Judge Davis in Chambers does suggest 
considerable weakness on the part of the interpreter. Chan 
initially responded to the question of his native language as 
"Hong Kong," before correcting himself (R. 124). Chan also made 
a linguistic error (similar to errors apparent in the indented 
except cited above) when he told the court, "my second language 
is Mandarin, and third one is English" (R. 124). These errors 
were made in twenty-five short lines of speech from the record. 
2Another line of inquiry by the court determined that Kim-Fai 
Chan had no experience interpreting in court at any level (R. 127) . 
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Obviously there was much greater opportunity for error during the 
trial itself. 
The State agrees that the "most competent and least biased" 
person should be appointed interpreter, following the Kiev v. 
Abell, 483 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. App. 1972), opinion. Br. of Appellee 
at 5. However, the State overstates its criticism of Fung's 
omission of the word "available" in his reference to the Kiev 
opinion in Appellant's brief. Id. First, that an interpreter 
must be available in order to be appointed goes without saying, 
so that the condition of "availability" in Kley, without 
elaboration, adds nothing, and may be dictum. Kiev, 483 S.W.2d 
at 628. 
Second, in the Kley case the plaintiff was a deaf mute who 
sued for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile 
accident. The deaf mute communicated only through grunts, 
gestures and motions which his brother understood, because it was 
a language of their own that they created when growing up. Kiev, 
483 S.W.2d at 628. Thus, the brother was the most competent and 
least biased interpreter "available," because he was the only 
competent translator. Id. If not mere dictum, then Kley at most 
suggests only that a competent translator exist in order to be 
"available." The real concern of the court in Kiev was that the 
most competent and least biased interpreter be appointed, as also 
evidenced by the fact that this black letter rule followed the 
following statement: 
An interpreter who functions with the sanction of the 
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court necessarily enjoys a preferred position, 
especially where, as here, his interpretations are not 
subject to refutation. 
Kiev, 483 S.W.2d at 628. 
Finally, the State argues that the word "available" is an 
important part of the Kiev holding, and is only dropped in State 
v. Givens, 719 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. App. 1986), case because it was not 
an issue in the Givens case. Br. of Appellee at 6. Though 
availability was not an issue in Givens, the reason the State 
gives for the omission of the word "available" is nevertheless 
purely speculative. It is equally possible that the court in 
Givens found the word "available" from Kley to be unnecessary 
dictum. 
The State also cites Hooks v. State, 534 So.2d 329 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1987), as an example of courts appointing "persons far 
more likely to be biased due to their positions." Br. of Appellee 
at 6. In Hooks, however, the court was applying different law. 
The opinion states that "the law in Alabama does not require that 
an interpreter be the 'least interested person available,'" and 
then refers to numerous cases when relatives or work-related 
interpreters were allowed. Hooks, 534 So.2d at 356. 
Commonwealth v. Carillo, 465 A.2d 1256 (Pa. Super. 1983), 
cited by the State for the same proposition, is also easily 
distinguished from the case at Bar. Br. of Appellee at 6. 
Carillo held that only that the assignment of a police officer 
did not presumptively prejudice criminal defendant. Carillo, 465 
A.2d at 1264 (emphasis added). The following excerpt 
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demonstrates that the reasoning which the Carillo court employed 
does not apply to Fung as the State suggests: 
Therefore, because of the preceding [that 
qualification of interpreters does not reach 
constitutional proportions] and the safeguards already 
afforded an accused by our judicial system in the form 
of pre-trial, post-trial and appellate review, we 
refuse appellant's invitation to adopt a per se rule 
that there is an inherent bias, and a violation of due 
process rights, whenever a police officer is called 
upon to serve as a defendant's interpreter at an 
interrogation. Rather, we are of the mind that a 
contention that an interpreter was biased, prejudiced 
or unfair toward the affected non-English-speaking 
defendant must be borne out by the record. 
Carillo, 465 A.2d at 1264. This holding does not fit the case at 
Bar because the safeguards referred to in the opinion do not 
protect Fung in the special circumstances of this case as they 
protected the defendant in Carillo. 
Furthermore, the Carillo court was of the opinion that a per 
se rule such as the defendant there requested would impose the 
impossible requirement that all police forces in Pennsylvania, 
regardless of size, employ an interpreter for all non-English 
speaking persons subject to interrogation. Id. at n. 4. Fung 
requests no such per se rule, and there is no corresponding 
concern for unreasonable cost, as no new state employees are 
necessary to assure the proper application of a standard which 
Fung asserts is already statutorily mandated. 
CONCLUSION 
Fung urges this Court to hold that any application of Rule 
3-306 must be rigorous when the language of translation is rare, 
or when the translation will not be made part of the record. 
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Failure to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial in this 
way should be held to constitute an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court. Because the trial court abused its discretion by 
not rigorously or otherwise properly applying Rule 3-306 when 
there was no other protection available to the defendant, this 
Court should vacate Fung's conviction and remand the case for a 
new trial. 
DATED this J day of October, 1995. 
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